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Abstract: 
We provide a justification for political liberalism’s Reciprocity Principle, which states that 
political decisions must be justified exclusively on the basis of considerations that all reasonable 
citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. The standard argument for the Reciprocity 
Principle grounds it in a requirement of respect for persons. We argue for a different, but 
compatible, justification: the Reciprocity Principle is justified because it makes possible a 
desirable kind of political community. The general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle, we 
will argue, helps realize joint political rule and relationships of civic friendship. The main 
obstacle to the realization of these values is the presence of reasonable disagreement about 
religious, moral, and philosophical issues characteristic of liberal societies. We show the 
Reciprocity Principle helps to overcome this obstacle.  
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1. Introduction 
How should political decisions be justified given profound and persistent disagreement among 
citizens about religious, moral, and philosophical issues? Political liberals answer this question in 
terms of a principle of reciprocity in political justification: 
Reciprocity Principle: When making political decisions, citizens must rely only 
on considerations that they can reasonably expect all reasonable citizens to 
accept.2 
Characteristic examples of considerations that political liberals believe we cannot reasonably 
expect all reasonable citizens to accept are those that issue from religious, moral, and 
philosophical convictions. Examples of considerations we can reasonably expect all reasonable 
citizens to accept include liberal democratic values of freedom, equality, and the ideal of fair 
social cooperation. The Reciprocity Principle asks citizens to rely only on such public 
considerations in their political deliberation, and to refrain from appeal to their religious, moral, 
and philosophical views. The principle applies to the political deliberation of legislators and 
judges, but also to ordinary citizens in their capacity as voters. The Reciprocity Principle is 
central to political liberalism’s accounts of public reason, political legitimacy, and religious 
toleration. 
 The Reciprocity Principle places a strong restriction on citizens’ political deliberation, so we 
have reason to ask for a justification of this principle. This question has not received the attention 
                                                
2 Classic statements of political liberalism include John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), and Charles Larmore’s The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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one would expect given the importance of political liberalism in contemporary political thinking. 
When political liberals have provided a justification for the Reciprocity Principle, their standard 
strategy has been to appeal to a requirement of respect. On this view, political decisions are 
characteristically coercive, and respect requires that the exercise of government coercion is 
justifiable to those who are coerced. The standard view takes the Reciprocity Principle to capture 
this requirement: the exercise of coercive force is justifiable to each citizen only if it is based on 
considerations that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. This view 
grounds the Reciprocity Principle in a more basic entitlement of each individual, either as a 
citizen or simply as a person, to be treated with respect.3 
 In this article, we develop a different strategy for justifying the Reciprocity Principle. While 
the standard view draws on liberal values of respect and individual freedom, our strategy focuses 
on democratic values of political community: joint rule and civic friendship. Joint rule refers to 
the ideal of political power being exercised by the people as a group; civic friendship refers to an 
ideal of social cooperation according to which all citizens can see the exercise of political power 
to work to the benefit of each. We will argue that, given plausible background conditions, 
citizens’ general adherence to the Reciprocity Principle realizes joint rule and civic friendship 
despite the presence of profound disagreement about religious, moral, and philosophical issues. 
John Rawls’s writing contains similar suggestions, and Kyla Ebels-Duggan and Andrew Lister 
                                                
3 For examples of political liberals who hold the standard view, see Charles Larmore, ‘The Moral 
Basis of Political Liberalism,’ Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999), Martha Nussbaum ‘Perfectionist 
Liberalism and Political Liberalism,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2011), and James 
Boettcher ‘Respect, Recognition, and Public Reason,’ Social Theory and Practice 33 (2007). 
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have also argued that political liberalism is animated by a concern for political community under 
conditions of pluralism. 4  Our discussion builds upon this work by providing detailed and 
separate accounts of joint rule and civic friendship, and by specifying precisely how citizens’ 
compliance with the Reciprocity Principle realizes these values of political community.  
 While the standard view takes reasonable pluralism to pose a threat to the respectful 
treatment of individual citizens, primarily conceived of as subjects to political rule, our view 
takes reasonable pluralism to threaten the realization of valuable relationships between citizens, 
conceived of as wielders of political power as well as subjects to that power. We provide an 
argument for the Reciprocity Principle based on the value of political community, but our aim is 
not to argue against the standard view.5 In fact, our community-based justification is compatible 
                                                
4 For example, see: Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,’ The University Of Chicago 
Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, (1997), p. 771; Kyla Ebels-Duggan, ‘The Beginning of Political 
Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement,’ The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2, 
(2010), pp. 50-71, Andrew Lister, Public Reason and Political Community, (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013). 
5 For criticisms of the standard view, see: Christopher Eberle, Religious Convictions in Liberal 
Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Joseph Raz, ‘Disagreement in 
Politics,’ The American Journal of Jurisprudence 43, (1998): 25-52; Gerald Gaus and Kevin 
Vallier, ‘The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of 
Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions,’ Philosophy and Social Criticism 35, (2009), 
51-76. 
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with the standard view, so it is possible that the Reciprocity Principle is supported by 
considerations of respect as well as the value of joint rule and civic friendship.6  
 
2. The Reciprocity Principle 
Before we turn to our main argument, we need to specify how we understand the Reciprocity 
Principle. Our formulation of the principle is simplified in two ways. First, it does not include 
Rawls’s proviso, allowing citizens to appeal to their religious, moral, and philosophical 
convictions “provided that, in due course, [they] give properly public reasons to support the 
principles and policies [their] comprehensive doctrine is said to support.” 7  Second, our 
formulation of the principle leaves open whether the Reciprocity Principle applies to all political 
decisions, or to some narrower range of questions such as those concerning constitutional 
essentials or matters of basic justice. This means that our statement of the principle may be too 
                                                
6 One could also refer to relationships of civic friendship as relationships of “mutual respect,” as 
Lister proposes (Public Reason and Political Community, chapter 5). We prefer to reserve the 
notion of respect to describe individual entitlements to certain kinds of treatment, rather than a 
desirable relationship between people in their role as citizens. However, our difference with 
Lister on this point is, at bottom, merely terminological. Further, our claim that the Reciprocity 
Principle helps realize values of joint rule and civic friendship is compatible with the claim that 
the opportunity to exercise political power together with one’s fellow citizens on terms of civic 
friendship is in turn owed to each citizen as a matter of respect. We are not aware of an account 
of civic respect that makes this claim, but we offer no argument against it. 
7 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 453. 
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strong, but in both cases, our argument will not depend on these further specifications of the 
principle.  
 Three features of the Reciprocity Principle are important to highlight, since they figure 
importantly in our argument below. First, the principle governs political justification, conceived 
as an activity in which citizens engage. When citizens deliberate about how to vote in a 
referendum on public funding for religious education, they are engaged in a process of political 
justification. The Reciprocity Principle imposes a duty of citizenship on individuals engaged in 
this kind of justification: they should not appeal to a consideration unless they can reasonably 
expect all other reasonable citizens to accept it. This contrasts with related principles that impose 
a necessary condition on the justification of political outcomes, where justification is understood 
as a property of such outcomes. According to principles of this kind, political outcomes, such as 
laws or policies, are justified only if they are sufficiently supported by considerations that all 
reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. We do not argue against principles of 
the latter kind, but it is crucial to our arguments that the Reciprocity Principle be understood as a 
principle that regulates citizens’ political deliberation and decision-making.  
 Second, the Reciprocity Principle is premise-targeting. It imposes a restriction on the 
considerations citizens can properly take to speak for or against political decisions; it does not 
impose a restriction on political outcomes directly. In many cases, the requirement to appeal only 
to a restricted set of considerations will narrow the scope of political disagreement, but the 
principle leaves room for reasonable disagreement about which laws or policies are supported by 
the set of shared considerations. In this respect, the Reciprocity Principle differs from 
conclusion-targeting principles of mutual justifiability that a number of authors have recently 
defended.  According to these principles political outcomes, rather than the considerations that 
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justify these outcomes, must be the object of idealized agreement.8 These views do not construe 
mutual justifiability as requiring that the law or policy be supported by any reasons that are 
shared among reasonable citizens. Instead, the demand of mutual justifiability is satisfied when 
each citizen has sufficient reason to accept the law or policy based on her own worldview. 
 Third, the Reciprocity Principle refers to reasonable citizenship.9 The relevant notion of 
reasonableness is not an intuitive notion of who is a reasonable person; rather, it expresses a 
substantial ideal of citizenship. According to this ideal, all reasonable citizens endorse a set of 
basic liberal-democratic values, such as freedom, equality, the rule of law, and the idea of fair 
social cooperation, together with a set of uncontroversial political values such as security and 
efficiency. These values provide the Reciprocity Principle with some of its positive content. 
Despite reasonable pluralism about religion, morality, and philosophy, reasonable citizens can 
expect one another to accept these political values.10 As a result, citizens can rely on these values 
                                                
8 See Gerald Gaus’s “Basic Principle of Justification,” and the ensuing discussion in §14 of his 
The Order of Public Reason, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 263-265; Kevin 
Vallier’s ‘Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason,’ Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4 
(2011), pp. 261-279; and Christopher Eberle’s ‘Consensus, Convergence and Religiously 
Justified Coercion,’ Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4 (2011), pp. 281-303. 
9 The principle refers to reasonableness twice: the principle is concerned with the expectations of 
reasonable citizens about what their fellow reasonable citizens can accept. The principle refers to 
the same conception of reasonable citizenship in both cases.  
10 In some places, Rawls’s writing may suggest a thinner conception of reasonable citizenship, 
which commits citizens to seek and abide by fair principles of cooperation, but not to more 
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when they justify political decisions. Of course, it is important for political liberals to explain 
what entitles them to this substantial conception of reasonableness, but that is not a question we 
consider in this article.11 
 
3. The Reciprocity Principle and Political Community 
Our justification of the Reciprocity Principle starts with two assumptions. The first is that it is 
important that citizens jointly exercise political power; the second is that it is important for 
                                                                                                                                                       
substantial liberal-democratic political values. This reading cannot, however, be made consistent 
with Rawls’s overall argument in Political Liberalism, and he sometimes explicitly takes the idea 
of reasonable citizenship to include a commitment to a broader range of political values (for 
example, Political Liberalism, p. 50, and ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,’ p. 776). For a 
systematic discussion of the requirements of reasonableness, see R.J. Leland and Han van 
Wietmarschen, ‘Reasonableness, Intellectual Modesty, and Reciprocity in Political Justification,’ 
Ethics 122 (2012), pp. 721-744. 
11 This may seem problematic. After all, if we acknowledge reasonable disagreement about 
religion, morality, and philosophy, shouldn’t we also acknowledge reasonable disagreement 
about freedom, equality, and fair social cooperation, or at least about how these political values 
are best understood? Political liberalism’s different treatment of reasonable sectarian 
disagreement and reasonable political disagreement is sometimes labeled the “asymmetry 
problem.” We favor the line of response to this problem defended in chapter 7 of Jonathan 
Quong’s Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and in §3.B of 
our “Reciprocity in Political Justification,” but we cannot explore this issue further here. 
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citizens to stand in a relationship of civic friendship to one another. As a consequence, if 
citizens’ general compliance with the Reciprocity Principle realizes joint rule and civic 
friendship, then each citizen has a strong pro tanto reason to comply with that principle, on the 
condition that their fellow citizens comply with the principle as well. These are substantial 
assumptions, so a full justification of political liberalism in terms of the values of political 
community should provide a further defense of these assumptions. We briefly return to this point 
in section 4. 
 The main arguments of this article are in support of two further claims. First, in section 3.a, 
we argue that citizens’ general compliance with the Reciprocity Principle, provided a number of 
plausible background conditions are satisfied, makes it the case that citizens jointly exercise 
political power. Second, in section 3.b, we argue that general compliance with the Reciprocity 
Principle among citizens, when a number of plausible background conditions are satisfied, makes 
it the case that those citizens stand in a relationship of civic friendship to one another. As will 
become clear, one of the most important obstacles to the realization of joint rule and civic 
friendship in liberal democracies is the presence of religious, moral, and philosophical 
disagreement. In the course of arguing for our main claims, we will develop conceptions of joint 
rule and civic friendship suitable to such pluralistic societies. Thus, our overall aim is to show 
how the Reciprocity Principle makes possible robust forms of civic friendship and joint rule 
despite profound, but reasonable, disagreement.  
 
a. Joint Rule 
There is a long tradition of thinking that a genuinely democratic society should support a robust 
form of joint rule. When a democratically elected government (a government of the people) 
11 
rules, it is, or should be, ruled by the people. Once we acknowledge that conditions of freedom 
give rise to reasonable disagreement about a wide range of moral, philosophical, and religious 
issues, it can seem that this idea of joint rule ought to be abandoned. After all, it does seem that, 
if we could expect citizens to endorse a particular moral, religious, or philosophical doctrine, 
then this shared worldview could provide a basis for joint rule. So long as a democratically 
elected government in such a homogenous society ruled on the basis of the shared worldview, 
there would be a straightforward sense in which the government’s rule was the rule of the 
people. This type of unified political society, for which Rawls reserves the term “political 
community,” 12  is not compatible with the protection of individual liberties—freedoms of 
conscience, expression, association, and so on—and the pluralism that arises wherever those 
liberties are honored. If this homogeneity of worldview were the only basis for joint rule, we 
would be forced into a choice between individual liberties and the democratic ideal of joint rule, 
and it would seem wise to give up the latter. 
 One way to respond to this tension between liberalism and democracy is to temper our 
ambitions for joint rule. For example, we might hold that the point of democratic institutions, 
such as voting procedures, is to aggregate individual citizens’ preferences or judgments. We 
could then say that citizens of a democracy rule together, not because they share any substantial 
beliefs or values, but because the procedure counts each citizen’s preference or judgment and 
weighs them all equally. We rule because each of us has an equal say in how political power is 
exercised. This aggregative conception of joint rule is disappointingly thin. Perhaps this is the 
most we can have in a liberal society characterized by reasonable pluralism, but it is worth 
                                                
12 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 40-43. 
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considering whether a more robust conception of joint rule can be instantiated in a modern 
liberal democracy. 
 A second response to the tension between individual liberty and joint rule seeks civic unity in 
nationality. Even if citizens in a liberal society are divided by faith, morality, and philosophy, 
perhaps they are united by a sense of shared history, a common bond to a particular territory, a 
language, shared cultural practices, and so on.13 When the citizens of a state are bound together 
by a shared national culture of this kind, then political decisions that reflect these shared 
commitments are, arguably, the decisions of the people. The problem with this proposal is that it 
offers a conception of joint rule that demands conformity to a national culture, a demand which 
excludes cultural outsiders and imposes pressures for homogeneity that seem at odds with liberal 
democratic commitments. Moreover, in so far as people can reasonably disagree about the 
character and value of a national culture, the nationalist proposal is incompatible with reasonable 
pluralism.  
 The Reciprocity Principle plays a central role in an account of joint rule that avoids the 
problems of the aggregative and nationalist responses. Reasonable citizens’ commitment to the 
Reciprocity Principle, when taken together with some other plausible assumptions about their 
attitudes toward political cooperation, means that those citizens are involved in a shared activity 
                                                
13 Some proposals that emphasize the significance of nationality for liberal democracies are: 
Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996); David 
Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Yael Tamir, Liberal 
Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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of justifying political decisions. The resulting decisions are the people’s decisions because they 
are the outcome of such a shared activity of political justification. 
 The Reciprocity Principle helps realize a kind of joint deliberation at the political level that is 
structurally similar to processes of joint deliberation found in smaller groups, so we begin with a 
smaller-scale case of shared deliberation before turning to discussion of joint political rule.  
 Consider a philosophy department deciding who should receive a new professorship. 
Members of the group often care that the decision is made by the department as a whole, rather 
than by a faction or a particular member. Formal voting procedures are one element of many 
departmental joint decisions. In such decisions, each member has the opportunity to vote, with 
each vote given equal weight. By virtue of these features, a vote can contribute to the sense in 
which the resulting decision is made by the department as a whole. Imagine, however, that 
holding a vote of this kind is all that the department does to ensure that the decision is made by 
the members as a group. It can make sense to speak of the resulting decision as the department’s, 
but, as in the political case, this would be to invoke a very minimal sense of joint decision. 
 A common way to secure a more robust form of shared decision-making is to deliberate 
together before voting. Members of a department may have a face-to-face discussion on the 
relative merits of the candidates, in which each is free to have her say, and the views of each are 
considered by all. When a candidate is selected by a fair vote after such a process of deliberation, 
the resulting decision is the department’s in a stronger sense than is the case when the voting 
procedure takes the undiscussed judgments of the individual members as inputs. But this type of 
face-to-face deliberation is not feasible at the scale of most contemporary political entities. Small 
14 
subsets of citizens and the members of a legislature could deliberate in this way, but the people 
as a whole cannot.14  
 Is there a kind of shared deliberation that citizens could engage in at the scale of a 
contemporary political society? We think there is, and that it is one commonly engaged in by 
smaller groups as well. When it comes to hiring decisions, individual members of philosophy 
departments typically spend a lot of time reading application files on their own. By itself, this is 
merely deliberation at roughly the same time rather than shared deliberation. But such activities 
can become a part of a process of shared deliberation when the individual members of the 
department evaluate the application files in light of a shared commitment to treat certain 
considerations as reasons counting for or against candidates. The members of the department 
may have a shared commitment to treat a research interest in epistemology and an impressive 
writing sample as reasons that speak in favor of a candidate, to treat the absence of demonstrated 
interest in undergraduate teaching to count against a candidate, and to treat the prestige of the 
candidate’s graduate institution as irrelevant. Department members can participate in such a 
                                                
14 This suggests a third response to the tension between liberalism and democracy: we should 
temper the ambitions of joint rule by limiting joint rule to small groups of people acting as 
representatives. If the resulting picture is that the representatives rule together rather than the 
people, then this response does not deliver an attractive ideal of democratic joint rule. If the 
picture is that the people rule through the decisions of a group of representatives, we would need 
a story about why the decisions of the representatives count as decisions of the people. Part of 
this story will likely be the claim that the people jointly select the representatives. This kind of 
joint decision to appoint representatives is exactly the kind of joint decision we discuss.  
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shared commitment even if some of them personally disagree with it. A member can look at files 
with the understanding that we are looking for someone working in epistemology, even if she 
thinks the department has too many epistemologists and would do better to hire a political 
philosopher. 
 Shared commitments of this kind commonly structure processes of shared deliberation more 
generally. Members of a board of directors deliberate about the company strategy in light of a 
shared commitment to treat certain considerations (say, short-term profits) as irrelevant to a 
company’s decisions. Family members resolve together to treat warm weather or remoteness, but 
not the local cuisine, as considerations that bear on where the family should vacation. The 
question is, can citizens’ political deliberation be structured by a shared commitment to treat 
certain considerations as reasons? To answer this question, we turn to Michael Bratman’s work 
for a systematic treatment of such shared commitments.  
 On Bratman’s view, the following features suffice to give rise to cases of shared deliberation 
among members of a group: 
(a) The members each intend: 
(1) that all members take into account only a particular set of considerations in their 
deliberation together; 
(2) that (1) proceed by way of members’ (a)(1)-intentions and their meshing sub-plans to 
realize these intentions. 
(b) There is mutual interdependence between each of their (a)-intentions.  
16 
(c) (a) and (b) are common knowledge among the members.15 
In order to avoid circularity in the proposal, the “deliberation together” mentioned in (a)(1) 
should be understood in a shared intention neutral sense, as deliberation where each member of 
the group does his part in the decision-making, but not necessarily with the intentions specified 
by (a)-(c). Condition (a)(2) requires that participants intend the joint deliberation to come about 
because all participants freely bring it about (rather than under pressure of coercion, for 
example). It also requires that they all intend for one another to be mutually responsive in 
forming sub-plans to realize the intended result. For instance, if you take files 1-20 home to read, 
I will plan to read those files another time.  
 The mutual interdependence mentioned in (b) means that the persistence of the intentions of 
each of the members described in (a) is conditional on the known persistence of the (a)-
intentions of the other members of the group. When (b) is satisfied, some members’ defection 
from the shared plan will lead others to likewise withdraw their (a)-intentions.  
 Condition (c) is a common knowledge condition. It requires all members to know: that (a) 
and (b) are satisfied by all the members, that members know that each of them knows that (a) 
and (b) are satisfied, and so on. This condition supports the mutual dependence listed under (b).  
 We will assume that Bratman’s account correctly describes one way in which people can 
engage in a shared process of deliberation.16 To show that the Reciprocity Principle contributes 
                                                
15 See Michael Bratman's Shared Agency, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Chapter 7. 
Bratman’s focus is on shared commitments to the weights of reasons. But, as he notes, the 
approach also works for shared commitments to count certain commitments as reasons. 
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to joint rule, we will show that the general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle secures a 
central component of a Bratmanian structure of interlocking attitudes, and that given plausible 
background conditions, reasonable members of a political society can satisfy each of the 
conditions (a)-(c) and thereby engage in a process of shared political deliberation. 
 Imagine the citizens of a democratic society deciding an important political question by 
referendum—for example, whether same-sex marriages should be legally recognized. 17  A 
general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle among reasonable citizens means that each 
intends to deliberate about whether same-sex marriages should be legally recognized exclusively 
in terms of considerations they can reasonably expect all reasonable citizens to accept. As we 
mentioned before, the “reasonableness” referenced by the Reciprocity Principle is a substantial 
political ideal, not simply an intuitive idea of reasonableness. So, in the scenario under 
consideration, each citizen intends to deliberate using the same set of considerations as their 
fellow reasonable citizens. This means that the general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle 
provides a key component of the structure of shared deliberation: citizens who endorse the 
Reciprocity Principle intend to take into account only a particular set of considerations in their 
deliberation together. A general commitment to treat certain considerations as relevant in 
                                                                                                                                                       
16 For alternative accounts, see Margaret Gilbert’s plural subject theory in Chapters 6-7 of A 
Theory of Social Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), or Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller’s account of we-intentions 
in ‘We-Intentions,’ Philosophical Studies 53 (1988), pp. 367-389. 
17 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between public reason and same-sex marriage in 
Canada, see Lister, Public Reason and Political Community, chapter 6.  
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political deliberation is not, however, a joint commitment to do so. The question is whether, 
under plausible circumstances, the further conditions that give rise to a shared process of 
deliberation could also be satisfied. 
 Start with condition (a)(1). Consider the difference between a citizen’s deliberation about her 
vote in a referendum on the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, and her deliberation with co-
parishioners about whether her religious denomination should recognize same-sex marriage. The 
Reciprocity Principle only restricts the first kind of deliberation.18 In our referendum scenario, 
citizens are aware that their deliberation results in political action. They are also aware that their 
own deliberation is part of a larger decision-making process in which many of their fellow 
citizens participate, and that the final decision is sensitive to the conclusions of all participants. A 
citizen’s commitment to the Reciprocity Principle signifies a concern for political decisions to be 
made on the basis of public considerations. Given that citizens are aware of the modest role their 
own decision plays in the overall process, it would be odd for any one citizen to be concerned 
only with her own conformity to the Reciprocity Principle. Rather, the concern with public 
justification, expressed by the endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle, plausibly translates not 
just into an individual intention to comply with the principle, but also into an intention that we all 
deliberate in accordance with the principle. This suggests that reasonable citizens could satisfy 
condition (a)(1) given a plausible level of understanding of the political process.  
 Condition (a)(2) requires that the deliberators don’t intend to bypass the intentions of their 
fellow citizens to participate in the process of deliberation, and it requires that participants intend 
                                                
18 This accords with Rawls’s idea of a background culture that is not constrained by a duty of 
civility, see Political Liberalism, p. 220 and p. 382.  
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to avoid conflicts in their subplans for deliberation. Because it is hard to imagine a person 
unintentionally engaged in political deliberation, it is not easy to see how the first part of this 
requirement could fail to be satisfied.19 If our shared deliberation involves each of us reflecting 
on a political question in light of the same set of considerations, it is likewise hard to see how we 
could fail to intend for our subplans to mesh. It is not as if our shared political values are a finite 
resource, so that when I am using them for my political deliberation, you can’t. In so far as our 
shared deliberation involves actual conversation, we could fail to meet the second part of (a)(2) 
by, for example, intending to deceive or talk over one another. Since we already assume 
reasonable citizens are concerned with treating each other as free and equal persons (recall our 
discussion of reasonable citizenship in section 2), reasonable citizens will, under reasonably 
favorable conditions, be able to satisfy this part of (a)(2).20 
 Under plausible conditions, would reasonable citizens’ (a)-intentions be conditional on a 
similar commitment on the side of their fellow reasonable citizens, as demanded by condition 
(b)? Since the central intention is the intention that all citizens govern themselves by the 
Reciprocity Principle, it seems that there would be little reason to maintain that intention unless 
                                                
19 In other cases of shared intentional activity, such as driving to Boston together, it is much 
easier to see how this condition could fail: I could intend that we drive to Boston together by me 
tying you up and putting you in my trunk, bypassing your intention to drive to Boston with me. 
Bratman discusses this case at p. 104 of “Shared Intention” Ethics 104 (1993): 97-113. 
20 These remarks apply to the activity of shared political deliberation in particular, so we do not 
claim that reasonable citizens would normally satisfy (a)(2) when it comes to shared political 
activity generally.  
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others have matching (a)-intentions.21 Moreover, the Reciprocity Principle imposes a demanding 
restriction on citizens. Political decisions often have profound effects on individual citizens’ 
lives. When making such decisions, citizens are asked to leave aside their religious, moral, and 
philosophical views. Many citizens take such views to be central to their lives, and these views 
often have strong prima facie implications for how political questions should be decided. This 
alone suggests that citizens may be unwilling to make this sacrifice if their fellow reasonable 
citizens are not prepared to do the same. For these reasons, it seems that reasonable citizens’ (a)-
intentions would often be conditional on their fellow reasonable citizens’ (a)-intentions. 
 This does not rule out scenarios in which some citizens are unconditionally committed to the 
Reciprocity Principle. For instance, those who believe that violations of the Reciprocity Principle 
constitute disrespectful treatment of other citizens might not alter their commitments to the 
principle even when their fellow citizens withdraw their commitments. A society of such 
unconditionally committed citizens would not be jointly committed to the principle, and their 
general commitment to the principle would not contribute to their joint exercise of political 
power. However, our claim is not that the general endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle 
inevitably gives rise to joint political rule; we only claim that the general endorsement of the 
Reciprocity Principle, given plausible background conditions, does realize the conditions for 
                                                
21 Here we differ from Lister, who thinks that reasons of political community for compliance 
with the Reciprocity Principle persist whenever at least one other citizen is also committed to the 
Reciprocity Principle. See his discussion of bilateral and multilateral reciprocity in Public 
Reason and Political Community, pp. 123-124. 
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joint rule. The possibility of a society of unconditionally committed citizens does not undermine 
our argument. 
 Finally, would citizens’ commitment to the Reciprocity Principle be common knowledge 
among reasonable citizens, as condition (c) requires? Political decision-making in democratic 
societies is public in character. This does not mean that everyone’s voting behavior is public 
information, but political leaders, judges, and other officials regularly state the reasons for their 
decisions; ordinary citizens discuss political ideas and policies; decisions themselves are made 
public to the citizenry along with polling information about how and why voters made decisions; 
and so on. If citizens, including citizens in the capacity of legislators, judges, and the like, are 
consistently committed to the Reciprocity Principle, it seems that this commitment would be 
apparent in circumstances of publicity. This falls short of common knowledge, since some 
citizens may not know that everyone else recognizes the commitments of others, but it seems that 
generally available knowledge of widespread commitment to the Reciprocity Principle would be 
sufficient to support the conditionality of citizens’ commitments required by (b), which is the 
relevant consideration here.  
 Taking all this together: given a general commitment to the Reciprocity Principle and a 
number of further conditions that could plausibly be met by reasonable citizens in democratic 
societies, (a), (b), and an approximation of (c) are all satisfied. Against the background of these 
conditions, reasonable citizens are committed to deliberate about political issues together with 
their fellow citizens exclusively in terms of a particular set of considerations, conditional on their 
fellow citizens being likewise committed, and in the knowledge that they are so committed. This 
structure of interlocking attitudes realizes a robust sense of shared deliberation. If such a process 
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of shared deliberation is brought to bear on a political decision in the right way, then the 
resulting decision is a joint decision.22 
 We used the special case of a decision by referendum to illustrate our argument, but our 
account straightforwardly applies to democratic decisions to elect representatives, and to the 
decisions of groups of elected officials, such as members of a parliament, as well. The further 
idea that decisions of a group of representatives also count as the shared decisions of the 
citizenry as a whole, in virtue of the representative relation between citizen and legislator, 
requires additional steps that we cannot spell out here.23 
 This completes our argument for the claim that general compliance with the Reciprocity 
Principle among citizens makes it the case that the exercise of political power is the joint 
exercise of political power by those citizens, provided a number of plausible background 
conditions are in place. It should be clear that we have not argued that the general endorsement 
of the Reciprocity Principle is sufficient for joint rule. Instead, we have argued that the general 
endorsement of the Reciprocity Principle provides a key component of a set of interlocking 
attitudes and activities that together constitute a process of shared deliberation, which in turn 
forms the basis for a joint decision. Unlike conceptions of joint rule that take a shared religious 
                                                
22 It is not obvious what “the right way” amounts to in this context. The issue seems similar to 
the difficult problem of deviant causal connections between intention and action in the 
philosophy of action. Though we do not wish to diminish the complexities involved at this point, 
we cannot discuss these issues here.  
23 See Eric Beerbohm’s In Our Name (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015) for a recent 
account of these steps.  
23 
outlook or a shared sense of national identity as their starting point, participation in shared 
deliberation and joint political decision-making, as we conceive of it, does not depend on 
citizens’ affirmation of a controversial set of sectarian commitments. Consequently, the required 
attitudes and activities for joint rule, on our account, are compatible with a wide range of 
religious, moral, and philosophical convictions. This is not to say that participation in joint 
political rule is compatible with all sectarian views: some religious, moral, or philosophical 
views will outright reject the Reciprocity Principle.24 Other sectarian views may regard joint rule 
and its requirements as important, but sometimes outweighed by non-political values. People 
with such views will only be able to be full participants in joint political rule when such 
overriding concerns are not at stake.25  
 Our shared deliberation account does not reduce the ideal of joint rule to the aggregation of 
preferences, nor does it presuppose a shared national culture. There is, however, a fourth view of 
joint rule that we have not yet considered. Like the aggregative conception, this view takes 
democratic decision procedures to be central. But rather than accounting for joint rule in terms of 
the implementation of democratic procedures, this view takes a joint commitment to such a 
                                                
24 Political liberalism will have to count such views as unreasonable views. Our view is not 
different from any other interpretation of political liberalism on this point: political liberalism 
cannot show itself to be compatible with sectarian views which reject political liberalism’s 
central commitments.  
25 We will return to the question of how the values of political community relate to other, non-
political, values in the conclusion. 
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democratic procedure to be central to democratic joint rule.26 This “joint procedural commitment 
account” conceives of joint rule as a product of citizens’ joint commitment to treat the outcome 
of a fair democratic decision-making procedure as determining the group’s decision, and this 
need not include a commitment to the Reciprocity Principle. Hence, although the argument from 
joint rule shows that a general commitment to the Reciprocity Principle can help realize a robust 
form of joint rule, the argument does not show that our account of joint rule is preferable to the 
joint procedural commitment account. The argument from civic friendship, in the next 
subsection, will discriminate between our view and the joint procedural commitment account.27  
 
b. Civic Friendship 
The idea that the political relationship of citizens should involve a form of friendship, affection, 
or mutual interest and concern plays a significant role in the history of political thought. For 
instance, Aristotle regards civic friendship as the force “that seems to hold cities together,” and 
                                                
26 See Chapter 7 of Anna Stiltz’s Liberal Loyalty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) 
for a view of this kind. 
27 Paul Billingham argues that Andrew Lister’s community-based defense of political liberalism 
fails, in part, because Lister does not show that compliance with the Reciprocity Principle is 
necessary for joint rule. Billingham points out that a view like the joint procedural commitment 
account can also secure joint rule (see ‘Does Political Community Require Public Reason?: On 
Lister’s Defense of Political Liberalism,’ Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 15 (2016), pp. 23-
26). Our view differs from Lister’s in clearly distinguishing joint rule from civic friendship and 
in arguing that only the latter rules out the joint procedural commitment account. 
25 
claims “the highest form of justice seems to be a matter of friendship.”28 Rousseau also regards 
citizens’ affections for one another as an essential ingredient of a well-functioning political 
society.29 The proposals of philosophers who emphasize civic friendship differ in matters of 
detail, but they generally insist that citizens in a well-functioning state ought to care about one 
another’s fates, and regard their political responsibilities as a way of seeing to the interests of 
their fellow citizens. 
 However, another common thought is that civic friendship cannot be established or 
maintained under conditions of pluralism. Rousseau, for instance, regarded the maintenance of a 
shared national identity and the imposition of dogmas of civil religion as necessary to maintain 
civic friendship.30 More generally, it seems that the absence of a shared worldview or shared 
sense of ethnic or cultural membership can threaten citizens’ concern for one another’s good. In 
this section, we show how citizens’ general compliance with the Reciprocity Principle, given 
favorable background conditions, realizes relationships of civic friendship among citizens who 
reasonably disagree about religion, morality, and philosophy. 
                                                
28 See Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Roger Crisp, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 1155a. 
29 See “Of the Social Contract,” in The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, trans. 
Victor Gourevitch, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), II.9, and Emile, trans. 
Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 40. 
30 See ‘Considerations on the Government of Poland and Its Projected Reformation,’ 3.2-3.4, in  
The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, and ‘Of the Social Contract,’ IV.8.31-
35. 
26 
 To better understand how the idea of friendship may characterize the political 
relationship between citizens, it is useful to consider non-civic interpersonal friendship. 
Accounts of the nature of interpersonal friendship differ, but all plausible accounts require that 
friends have a non-prudential concern for one another. A person is motivated to benefit her 
friends, and regards this as something valuable in its own right, not simply as a means to advance 
her own ends.31 There are doubtless further requirements on interpersonal friendship. Plausibly, 
friends must share a species of intimacy or familiarity, and they may also need to share projects 
or activities with one another.32 Because we take a non-prudential concern for one another’s 
interests to be the core feature that civic friendship shares with interpersonal friendship, we will 
focus on mutual concern between friends, rather than these further requirements.  
 The relationship of mutual concern that characterizes interpersonal friendship involves 
more than just a non-prudential concern to benefit each other. To see why, consider two people 
who strongly disagree about what is in one another’s interest. Erica thinks that excellence in 
intellectual, artistic, and athletic pursuits is what is important in life, while Patrick believes a 
good life requires strong family relationships. It is easy to see that these conceptions of the good 
                                                
31 For an overview of the philosophical literature on friendship, see Bennett Helm ‘Friendship,’ 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/friendship/>. 
32  On self-disclosure in friendship, see Laurence Thomas, ‘Friendship,’ Synthese 72, no. 2 
(1987): pp. 217-236. For an account that emphasizes shared ends and activities, see Kyla Ebels-
Duggan, ‘Against Beneficence: A Normative Account of Love,’ Ethics 119, no. 1 (2008), pp. 
142-170.  
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can come into conflict: if Patrick is offered a scholarship at an excellent university far from his 
family, then Erica may think he should go, while Patrick may judge that he should not. Despite 
the disagreement, Erica and Patrick each have a non-prudential concern to benefit each other. 
 Two natural responses to this type of conflict are in tension with the relation of 
friendship. First, Erica could simply defer to Patrick’s conception of the good in her interactions 
with him, supporting and encouraging his choice to stay with his family, even though she does 
not believe doing so is good for him. This kind of deference may be acceptable at times, but a 
general practice of deference against the background of significant disagreement about Patrick’s 
good would border on insincerity and become hard to square with being a good friend. Second, 
Erica could insist on her own conception of the good, acting so as to make it more likely that 
Patrick takes the scholarship despite his belief in the value of family. Again, friends may 
understandably act this way in certain cases, but if Erica’s general practice were to insist on her 
own conception of Patrick’s good despite his disagreement, her attitude would be a form of 
paternalism that is at odds with friendship. 
 This suggests that friendship requires not just a non-prudential concern for one another’s 
interest, but also an at least partially shared conception of what is in one another’s interest. Erica 
and Patrick need to agree on a certain set of interests, SE, that belong to Erica, and on a certain 
set of interests, SP, that are Patrick’s. This kind of agreement allows Patrick to act in ways that 
both Patrick and Erica can believe to be in Erica’s interest, and vice versa. For this to be 
possible, SE and SP need not have common elements. Note that as described above, Erica 
believes that excellence in one’s pursuits makes for a good human life in general, and Patrick 
believes that family relationships are good in general. They would share a conception of one 
another’s interests in the relevant sense if they would both believe that excellence of pursuits is 
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good for Erica, and that strong family relationships are good for Patrick. Further, SE and SP can 
be partial descriptions of Erica’s and Patrick’s good: Erica and Patrick’s friendship can be based 
around a shared belief that academic achievement is good for Erica, and strong family ties are 
good for Patrick, even when they disagree about many other aspects of each other’s interests. 
 The idea that interpersonal friendship requires a shared partial conception of what is in 
one another’s interest may be surprising, since good friends often appear to have radically 
different and conflicting values. Our claims are fully consistent with this observation. First, for 
any pair of friends, their respective sets of interests can contain very different elements. If two 
people have sufficiently pluralistic conceptions of the good, they can each have dramatically 
different beliefs about what is in their own interest, but they can nonetheless each believe that 
what the other person takes to be in their own interest is genuinely good for them. Second, many 
people believe it is good to live a life in accordance with one’s own choices. This conception of 
what is in one another’s interest could form the basis of a friendship, even if the people involved 
make very different choices in life. If Erica would have this view, then she could regard it as 
important that Patrick gets to decide for himself whether to decline the scholarship, even if she 
thinks it would be better if he made a different choice. On this picture, their friendship would 
still involve a (partially) shared conception of one another’s good—in this case the good of 
making one’s own choices. 
 The requirement that friends share a partial conception of each other’s good extends 
naturally to the case of civic friendship as well. When we say that it is important for a political 
order to be one in which citizens care for one another as friends, we do not envision some 
imposing their conception of the good on others, nor do we imagine some deferring 
systematically to their fellow citizens. Instead, the ideal of civic friendship involves citizens 
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concerned to advance each other’s interests, in ways that all parties regard as genuinely 
beneficial.  
 On our view, a non-prudential concern to benefit one another in ways that all parties 
regard as valuable is central to both civic friendship and interpersonal friendship. However, civic 
friendship differs from interpersonal friendship in at least two important ways. First, civic friends 
relate to one another as citizens, and this relationship does not require knowledge of, or 
responsiveness to, the particular features of various citizens’ personalities. Second, civic 
friendship involves a non-prudential concern to benefit one’s fellows by distinctively political 
means—civic friends want to help one another through participation in political life. So civic 
friendship does not call for citizens to direct their personal lives to benefitting their fellows; they 
must simply be concerned that their political institutions, together with their participation in 
these institutions, aim to benefit fellow members of their political society.33 
 In sum, the core feature of civic friendship is present when citizens share a non-
prudential concern to benefit one another through political means, on terms that each regards as 
genuinely advancing the interests of herself and her fellow citizens.  
 Some people think that it is misguided to expect citizens to have this kind of non-
prudential concern for the interests of their fellows. Politics, on their view, is an arena where 
interest groups compete, with each trying to secure the best outcome for its members (perhaps 
subject to certain restrictions). This conception of politics as self-interested competition aptly 
describes some political scenarios, but it gives an overly narrow description of the attitudes of 
                                                
33 Our conception of civic friendship is similar to the one developed by Sibyl Schwartzenbach in 
‘On Civic Friendship,’ Ethics 107 (1996): pp. 97-128 (see especially pages 112-114). 
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many citizens in well-functioning liberal democracies. Furthermore, it is already part of political 
liberalism’s broader framework to assume citizens’ willingness to see the political relationship in 
terms of fair social cooperation rather than the mere advancement of personal interest. For these 
reasons we assume, for now, that citizens have a non-prudential concern to benefit one another. 
We return to the question of whether citizens can be expected to develop or maintain such a 
concern below.  
 However, even when this assumption is made, reasonable pluralism threatens to make a 
shared conception among citizens of what is in one another’s interest unavailable. Erica and 
Patrick, now considered in their role as citizens, can illustrate the problem. Suppose that Patrick 
endorses extensive parental leave schemes, subsidized child care, and tax breaks for families, 
based on his view that family relations are central to a good life. Meanwhile, Erica endorses 
increased funding for elite universities and subsidies for the arts and sports, based on the value 
she attaches to intellectual, artistic, and athletic pursuits. Erica and Patrick both think of these 
decisions as advancing the interests of all, and so fully in keeping with their non-prudential 
concern to benefit their fellow citizens, but they disagree about what these interests are. Political 
liberals regard this disagreement on what makes for a good human life as one aspect of the 
broader religious, moral, and philosophical disagreement that inevitably arises between 
reasonable citizens in liberal societies. Insistence on one’s own views as the basis for political 
action on the one hand, and deference to the views of one’s fellow citizens on the other are both 
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incompatible with the relationship of civic friendship. Consequently, reasonable pluralism 
threatens to undermine the basis for relationships of civic friendship.34 
As with joint rule, one response to this problem is to temper our ambitions when it comes 
to civic friendship. Perhaps we should see politics as a process of bargaining in which each aims 
to secure the best outcome for herself, or as a method of peaceful conflict resolution. On the 
other hand, one could insist on the value of civic friendship but conclude that this requires a 
shared national identity.  
 The Reciprocity Principle helps avoid both these responses. The principle asks each 
citizen to deliberate on political issues in light of a particular set of considerations that includes a 
core set of liberal-democratic values: liberty, equality, security, efficiency, and so forth. So when 
all reasonable citizens comply with the Reciprocity Principle, they make political decisions in 
light of the same set of considerations, those that all reasonable citizens accept and expect each 
other to accept. This means that the resulting decisions are based on considerations that all 
reasonable citizens already take to be among their values, independently of any shared 
commitment to treat these considerations as reason-giving in political deliberation. 
                                                
34 Reasonable pluralism would not threaten citizens’ formation of a shared conception of each 
other’s interests if citizens generally endorsed a sufficiently wide pluralistic view of the good, or 
if they all viewed the good life as a life lived in accordance with one’s own choices. However, to 
expect this kind of convergence in view would be to expect the absence of genuine pluralism. 
Political liberals are committed to the ongoing existence of pervasive disagreement on these 
questions. 
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 Here is another way to put the point: the Reciprocity Principle defines a conception of the 
good of citizens that is shared by reasonable citizens. The principle specifies a conception of the 
good of people as citizens, rather than of people as such, in the sense that it singles out a set of 
distinctly political values, such as freedom and equality, which apply specifically to citizens’ 
standing in a political society. The endorsement of these values is compatible with a wide range 
of further religious, moral, and philosophical commitments. This allows citizens of pluralistic 
societies who have a non-prudential concern for the interests of their fellow citizens to avoid 
taking a paternalistic or deferential stance. Given the general endorsement of the Reciprocity 
Principle, any reasonable citizen can: (1) act on her non-prudential concern to benefit her fellow 
reasonable citizens, (2) regard the actions of those citizens as being in her interest, and (3) expect 
her actions to be regarded by those citizens as being in their interest. Further, the Reciprocity 
Principle makes all of this consistent with widespread reasonable disagreement about religious, 
moral, and philosophical issues. In this way, general compliance with the Reciprocity Principle, 
assuming citizens have a non-prudential concern for one another’s interest, realizes relationships 
of civic friendship despite conditions of reasonable pluralism.35 
                                                
35 On our account, the Reciprocity Principle singles out a set of values that are part of all 
reasonable citizens’ conceptions of their good. As we explained above, however, relationships of 
friendship only require a shared conception of one another’s good in a weaker sense. There must 
be sets of interests, S1, S2, … Sn, belonging to each of the friends involved, such that all agree 
that each of these sets corresponds to a genuine part of that person’s good. There need not be one 
set of interests such that all believe that the members of that set are part of every person’s good. 
For example, all citizens may agree that economic growth is genuinely good for one group of 
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 In section 3.a, we considered the joint procedural commitment account, according to 
which citizens of a democratic society rule together when they are jointly committed to regard 
the outcomes of democratic procedures as settling the citizenry’s decisions about the exercise of 
political power. As we said, a joint commitment to such procedures can realize joint rule in much 
the same way that a joint commitment to the Reciprocity Principle can. A joint commitment to 
                                                                                                                                                       
citizens, environmental sustainability for a second group, and the alleviation of poverty for a 
third group. In that case, it seems that citizens could reach a compromise on a set of 
governmental policies that promotes each of these values to some degree, and all citizens could 
agree that these policies are in one another’s genuine interest. If such a constellation of values 
and beliefs could be found among reasonable citizens, and could be expected of them, then we 
see no reason why the relevant considerations would have to be excluded from political 
justification.  This might require a minor modification of the formulation of the Reciprocity 
Principle along the following lines: political decisions must be justified using only considerations 
that all reasonable citizens can expect one another to accept as genuinely important for at least 
some reasonable citizens. This does not imply a dramatic expansion of the set of considerations 
ruled in by the Reciprocity Principle. Consider, for example, the value of salvation. It is clear 
that many reasonable citizens believe salvation to be of the utmost importance. It is not true, 
however, that all reasonable citizens can be expected to believe that salvation is genuinely 
valuable for those who care about salvation. To think otherwise would fail to fully acknowledge 
the fact of reasonable disagreement; after all, many reasonable citizens believe salvation to be an 
altogether illusory aim. Similar observations would apply to other religious, moral, and 
philosophical views normally thought to be ruled out by the Reciprocity Principle. 
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democratic procedure does not, however, provide citizens with a partially shared conception of 
one another’s good beyond the very thin sense in which all citizens have an interest in 
democratic procedure being followed. When different groups in a citizenry, jointly committed to 
democratic procedure, vote in accordance with their reasonably disputed religious, moral, or 
philosophical convictions, citizens will not regard the resulting decisions as aiming to advance a 
shared conception of one another’s interests. For this reason, considerations of civic friendship 
favor the Reciprocity Principle over the joint procedural commitment account.  
 So far, we have assumed that citizens come to the table with a non-prudential concern for 
one another’s interests, and argued that the Reciprocity Principle plays an important role in 
providing citizens with a partially shared conception of one another’s good. But the Reciprocity 
Principle also plays a role in securing conditions in which concern for one’s fellow citizens is 
likely to develop and remain stable over time. To see how, consider the moral psychology of 
reciprocity found in John Rawls’s work. Rawls assumes that citizens of a just society tend to 
develop and act from a sense of justice, in part because they recognize that others likewise do 
their part in a scheme of fair social cooperation for mutual advantage. 36  This moral-
psychological conjecture figures importantly in his argument that a well-ordered society 
governed by his principles of justice would tend to maintain itself through time. 
 But when citizens lack a shared conception of one another’s interests, this moral 
psychology of reciprocity is unlikely to produce a non-prudential motive to benefit others 
through politics. If my fellow citizens do their part in establishing and maintaining a social 
                                                
36 See, for example: A Theory of Justice (rev. ed.), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 
p. 411; Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 196. 
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system, with an eye toward benefitting people like me, I am unlikely to be non-prudentially 
motivated to reciprocate if I think that either (1) their actions were not directed at advancing 
what I regard as a real interest of mine; or (2) that they did not conceive of themselves as aiming 
to advance a genuine interest of mine, even if they did so accidentally or deferentially. In the first 
case, I will tend to find their actions intrusive or paternalistic. In the second case, the fact that 
they did not see themselves as actually helping me will mute the gratitude and desire to 
reciprocate that often accompanies being benefitted by others’ efforts. By providing a shared 
conception of citizens’ interests, the Reciprocity Principle removes the principal obstacle to the 
mechanism of reciprocity in social cooperation. So if the moral-psychological conjecture holds, 
widespread compliance with the Reciprocity Principle promotes the development of motives of 
friendship by removing a major obstacle to the operation of the mechanism by which those 
motives develop. 
 We have seen two roles the Reciprocity Principle plays in establishing a community of 
civic friends. First, it provides a shared conception of citizens’ interests, so that they can be civic 
friends, assuming they possess the non-prudential motive to benefit one another on mutually 
acknowledged terms. Second, by doing so, it creates conditions in which the moral-
psychological mechanism of reciprocity can operate, so as to generate and sustain the non-
prudential motive to benefit one’s fellow citizens. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We began with the question: what justifies the Reciprocity Principle? To answer it, we showed 
how the Reciprocity Principle helps to realize joint political rule on terms of civic friendship 
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among free and equal citizens, despite conditions of profound reasonable disagreement. If our 
arguments succeed, then citizens’ general compliance with the Reciprocity Principle realizes 
important political values, and citizens have strong pro tanto reason to comply with the principle, 
provided enough of their fellow citizens likewise comply. In this concluding section, we discuss 
three limitations of the argument given in this article. 
 The first limitation is that we have not provided a defense of the exclusion of unreasonable 
citizens. On the view we presented, citizens can rule together on terms of civic friendship 
because they endorse the Reciprocity Principle, which directs them to justify political decisions 
in terms of considerations all reasonable citizens can be expected to accept. As we mentioned in 
section 2, reasonableness is a substantial ideal of citizenship. All those who fail to conform to 
this ideal don’t rule together on terms of civic friendship. What value is a political community if 
it excludes all those who are deemed unreasonable?  
 This is a large question, the answer to which turns on the appropriateness of taking the values 
built into political liberalism’s ideal of reasonable citizenship as starting points in an account of 
political justification. We cannot resolve this issue here, but this concern about exclusion arises 
for all mutual justifiability theories, not just for views that defend principles of mutual 
justifiability in terms of the values of political community. Any mutual justifiability theory, 
including the standard interpretation of political liberalism, will have to decide whether political 
justification requires justifiability to all points of view, or to some restricted set of “qualified” 
points of view.37 The former course requires political decisions to be justifiable to a constituency 
                                                
37 We borrow this terminology from chapter three of David Estlund’s Democratic Authority: A 
Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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that includes those radically opposed to basic liberal-democratic values of freedom and 
equality—for example, people who support an avowedly racist society. On this picture, mutual 
justifiability cannot be reconciled with a free society of equals. The latter course leads to the 
problem of exclusion: what justifies the exclusion of those who hold unqualified points of view, 
whoever they are, from the justificatory community? 
 The second limitation of our argument is that we have not provided a positive account of the 
value of joint rule and civic friendship. Appeals to political community tend to meet with two 
main objections: general skepticism about the value of joint rule and civic friendship, and 
skepticism about the feasibility of joint rule and civic friendship in large-scale, liberal 
democracies characterized by reasonable pluralism. We have addressed the second objection by 
showing how the Reciprocity Principle makes joint rule and civic friendship possible without 
demanding the general endorsement of a particular sectarian doctrine or conception of national 
culture. But we have not resolved the first objection here.  
 However, we are optimistic about the prospects for such a resolution. Both joint rule and 
civic friendship play a prominent role in the history of political thought. Joint rule captures the 
democratic ideal of political power being exercised together by the people.38 This in turn can 
form the basis of an account of democratic legitimacy: one reason why genuinely democratic 
                                                
38 For accounts of democracy that emphasize joint rule, see Rousseau’s Of the Social Contract; 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism, especially pp. 136-137 and 216-220; and Joshua Cohen’s ‘For a 
Democratic Society,’ in Freeman (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). For a general account of the importance of shared self-
governance see Bratman’s Shared Agency, pp. 141-144. 
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rule is authoritative is that those subject to political power are also those who wield political 
power on an equal footing.39 In addition, an account of joint political rule can be the basis of an 
explanation of the value of democratic self-determination.40 Civic friendship provides a plausible 
extension of the ideal of society as a fair system of social cooperation.41 A society of civic 
friends is not only a society governed by rules that work to the benefit of each, but a society in 
which each is concerned, and known by all to be concerned, that the rules of social cooperation 
work to the benefit of all. Furthermore, citizens have this concern to benefit one another through 
their political association against the background of a shared conception of what is in one 
another’s interest as citizens. 
                                                
39 For an account of the relationship between collective decision-making and democratic 
legitimacy, see Joshua Cohen’s ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,’ in Hamlin and Pettit 
(eds.) The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (New York: Blackwell, 1989). 
40 See Anna Stilz’s ‘The Value of Self-Determination,’ Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 
forthcoming.  
41  For historical discussions of civic friendship, see Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and 
Rousseau’s Of the Social Contract as mentioned at the start of section 3.b. Daniel Brudney 
argues that Marx’s discussion of reciprocal dependence in the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 constitutes an attractive ideal of friendship. See his ‘Two Types of Civic 
Friendship,’ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16(4) (2013), 729-743. For more contemporary 
discussion of this idea, see also Sibyl Schwartzenbach’s ‘On Civic Friendship.’ The conception 
of community in G.A. Cohen’s Why Not Socialism? (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 
2009), might also be plausibly regarded as, at least in part, an a ideal of civic friendship. 
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 The third limitation of our arguments concerns the space between pro tanto and all things 
considered justification. We have argued that citizens’ general compliance with the Reciprocity 
Principle helps realize values of political community, and so provides citizens with strong pro 
tanto reasons to comply with the Reciprocity Principle. We have not, however, weighed these 
benefits against the costs associated with compliance with the principle, nor have we considered 
whether a different principle might secure the same goods of political community with fewer 
costs than those imposed by the Reciprocity Principle. One source of such costs is the value 
citizens may attach to appealing to their religious, moral, and philosophical convictions in the 
context of political decision-making. The more citizens value such appeal, the more they will 
experience a tension between the democratic values associated with the Reciprocity Principle 
and their sectarian values, and the more difficult they may find full participation in joint rule and 
civic friendship to be. These comparisons would be necessary to support the stronger claim that 
the Reciprocity Principle is, all things considered, justified by the value of political community, 
and to support the claim that citizens are obligated to comply with the principle when they have 
assurance that enough others will likewise comply. 
 Each of these limitations of our argument are meant to indicate plausible avenues for further 
investigation of the political community view of political liberalism. They do not undermine the 
main conclusion of this article: the Reciprocity Principle makes possible robust forms of civic 
friendship and joint rule despite the presence of profound and persistent religious, moral, and 
philosophical disagreement.42 
                                                
42 For comments on this article, we thank four anonymous referees (at this journal and another), 
Sam Asarnow, Mark Budolfson, Michael Bratman, Josh Cohen, Lauren de los Campos Blancos, 
 
40 
                                                                                                                                                       
Marcello DiBello, Amanda Greene, David Hills, Dean Machin, Ben Miller, Véronique Munoz-
Dardé, Govind Persad, Debra Satz, Nic Southwood, Kevin Vallier, and Chad Van Schoelandt. 
We also thank audiences at Stanford’s Dirty Leviathan Graduate Student Retreat, Political 
Theory Workshop and Dissertation Development Seminar; at Franklin & Marshall College, MIT, 
NYU, SUNY Binghamton, UCL, the University of Pittsburg, and at an online working group 
sponsored by the Institute for Humane studies. 
 
